

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 25 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. MACOVESCU

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. K. CHRISTOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K.K. RAO  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGLIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALES

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. J. SLAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. G.A. WESTRING  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. el-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.N. LAMBERT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I declare open the twenty-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I should like first this morning in the plenary meeting of the Conference to refer to a proposal (ENDC/SC.1/PV.10, page 13) which the United States delegation made yesterday afternoon in the meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Because we felt it would be helpful to have some of the eight nations that sponsored the joint memorandum work with us in the Sub-Committee, we made the following proposal: that the Sub-Committee invite the sponsors of the joint memorandum to select two or three, or whatever number they may choose, of their delegations to work with us in the Sub-Committee, and that after discussion among the eight delegations the membership of the Sub-Committee should be formally expanded by approval of the Conference.

The representative of the United Kingdom supported this proposal but, for reasons which are unclear to us, our Soviet colleague reacted negatively and expressed opposition to the idea. The Soviet representative stated that in any case no decision could be made in the Sub-Committee, and that the matter could only be settled in a plenary meeting.

Therefore this morning, in this plenary meeting, I should like to introduce the proposal of the United States to invite the co-sponsors of the joint memorandum to select two or three, or whatever number they may choose, of their delegations to join in the work of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

Next, I should like to continue the discussion of stage I of general and complete disarmament and to continue my comparison of the United States draft with the Soviet draft.

In my statement yesterday (ENDC/PV.26, page 5) I referred in some detail to the first of the two major differences between the United States proposal (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) and the Soviet proposal (ENDC/2) in so far as they deal with the reduction of armaments during the first stage. I dealt with the reasons why I believe the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction in all categories of armaments during the first stage is preferable to the Soviet proposal, which envisages the complete elimination of those armaments capable of delivering nuclear weapons during stage I,

(Mr. Dean, United States)

while proposing only limited and unspecified cuts in other major conventional armaments. Today I would like to deal with the second major difference, that is, the proposal of the United States which provides not only for the reduction in the various categories of armaments but, with the limited exception which I will discuss today resulting from the tapering off of production, for the reduction of each type of armament within the category.

Yesterday I gave the reasons why, in the judgment of the United States delegation, a simultaneous and equal percentage reduction in all categories of significant and controllable armaments, as opposed to a reduction in some type of armaments within a category which was greater than that in other types, was consistent with paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961, which provides that:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, page 2)

In making its proposal for reduction by types within categories, the United States is going one step further in its attempt to comply with the spirit which underlies this simple principle. If the percentage reduction is merely within a particular category rather than by particular types within categories, the tendency would be for the reducing Powers to select the least efficient armaments within a particular category and to concentrate the total percentage reduction within the category of that particular armament.

This would make the definition of categories extremely difficult and very critical in the negotiation and indeed, perhaps, delay the reaching of agreement. A provision for negotiation by types would make the definition of categories considerably less significant and less of a stumbling block to reaching an agreement.

As I indicated in my initial speech on the United States programme on 18 April (ENDC/PV.23), the first category which the United States has proposed for the purpose of illustration is :

"(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater." (ENDC/30, and Corr.1, page 4)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Within this category the United States now has B-52 aircraft, Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound Dog missiles; and certain new types of armaments which have just come into production, such as Skybolt and Minuteman, together with their related fixed launching pads. Under the proposal of the United States, the United States would not be able, for example, to absorb the total 30 per cent cut by making a somewhat greater percentage reduction in its manned aircraft, such as its B-52s. The United States would have to apply the proposed cut across the board to various types of aircraft and missiles within the category. As I indicated earlier, this makes it less critical to the negotiations whether a particular manned bomber is to be included in the same category with certain types of missiles since, in the first instance at least, the cut will have to be computed equally for both.

Today, I am sorry to say, I cannot analyse the difference between the two positions as closely or as clearly as I did in my statement yesterday, because in those areas where the Soviet proposal does not provide for the immediate abolition of armaments during the first stage -- that is, no reduction in major conventional armaments -- it is just not clear what the Soviet proposal envisages with respect to the differences between types and categories. For example, paragraph 3 of article 11 of the Soviet draft merely provides that:

"All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed." (ENDC/2, page 10)

In my statement of 18 April I gave an illustration of the reduction which would be required in the case of tanks. I pointed out that the seventh category proposed by the United States includes all tanks. Thus in the case of the United States the cut in armaments would be a cut in each and every type of United States tank, such as the M-47 medium tank, the M-48 medium tank, and the M-60 main battle tank. Under the Soviet proposal, however, it is just not clear whether or not this would be the case. It is just not clear whether the destruction would have to be an equal percentage in the inventory in each and every type of tank, such as the Soviet JS-III heavy tanks, the T-10 heavy tanks, the T-54 medium tanks, the T-34/85 medium

(Mr. Dean, United States)

tanks and the PT-76 amphibious light tanks; or whether the Soviet Union could pick the least efficient type of these weapons in the particular category and apply a large portion, or perhaps even all, of the 30 per cent cut in tanks to this particular type. These are not generalities. This is a very important distinction which must be clearly realized in order to understand the respective treaty provisions.

Many of you may be asking yourselves this question. If the United States proposes to reduce by types within categories, why are they discussing general categories at all? In other words, you may say to yourselves: If there is to be a 30 per cent reduction in the United States B-52s -- that is, in manned aircraft -- and a 30 per cent reduction in Atlas missiles or, correspondingly, if there is to be a 30 per cent reduction in the Soviet Union's heavy 4-jet bomber designed by Miasishchev and in its various types of intercontinental missiles, what difference does it make whether these various types of armaments are in the same or in different categories? The answer to this question is found in the problems implicit in the tapering-off of production during stage I. This continued production during the tapering-off process makes it necessary still to consider categories of armaments although the definition of categories is much less critical than it would be if the initial reduction were to be by categories.

The United States treaty outline provides that by the beginning of stage II production shall be halted except for the production, within agreed limits, of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments. The applicable section is sub-paragraph a of paragraph 3 of article A of the United States draft (ENDC/30, page 6). A similar provision, the operative section of stage II, is found in sub-paragraph a of paragraph 4 of article A (ENDC/30, page 21).

It is not practical, however, to impose such a restriction on the production of armaments at a time when we are just starting on the path of disarmament in stage I. Naturally, we expect and hope that we shall go on to stages II and III and complete the process; but the dismantling of the industrialized base which underlies the production of armaments must be done gradually as confidence in the workability of the disarmament process increases. One of the reasons for this is that not all the countries whose participation is essential before we go all the way to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world may be in on the disarmament plan from the beginning. Until we are satisfied that all the militarily significant



(Mr. Dean, United States)

States are going to come in, neither side will be prepared to add to the drastic step of cutting its armaments the step of dismantling the production facilities which lie behind them.

It is presumably for this reason that neither in the programme of the United States nor in the programme of the Soviet Union is there a call for the complete cessation of production of armaments in stage I. Thus, the United States programme, in sub-paragraph a of paragraph 3 of article A (ENDC/30, page 6) provides that the production of the armaments to be reduced during stage I should be limited to "agreed allowances". The proposal of the Soviet Union contains a comparable provision. With respect to the armaments which the Soviet Union proposes to eliminate completely in stage I, it provides also, of course, for the complete elimination of production. I have already stated my reasons for believing these provisions in the Soviet draft to be inconsistent with paragraph 5 of our Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and hence not acceptable to the United States; I do not think it necessary to go over these arguments again now. With respect to those armaments which the Soviet Union proposes merely to reduce, not eliminate -- namely, conventional armaments -- the Soviet proposal for stage I provides that their production shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces. I call attention to article 12 of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2, page 10). I think it might be pointed out in passing that a similar provision is contained in stage II of the Soviet proposal; this is provided in article 25 (ENDC/2, page 17) dealing with the further reduction of armaments production.

The production that will be permitted during stage I should be quite small -- I repeat, quite small. However, it is unrealistic to expect that this production will be spread proportionately over all types of armaments in each category. For this reason it is to be expected that the continued production in stage I, even though it may be small, will change to some degree the proportion of the various types within each category. This again is an important point.

Because of this permitted production, the relationship between the number of B-52 aircraft, Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads, Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads, Polaris missiles and other armaments may not be the same after the 30 per cent cut as before the cut. This again is an important point which must not be overlooked.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The same result will be produced if a country elects to reduce its production of armaments within a particular category faster than the agreed rate specified in the treaty, and to apply the unused portion of its production allowance to retain existing types of armaments within the category, as provided in article A, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph c of the United States proposal (ENDC/30, page 6).

Two facts should be borne in mind in considering this possible variation of types within categories. The first is that the possible variation within categories under the United States proposal is much smaller than it would be if the proposed reduction were solely within categories, where there would be some freedom to make the entire 30 per cent reduction in a particular category by reducing a particular type within that category. This is true because in the United States proposal the variation within the categories is permitted only within the framework of a relatively small production allowance.

The second fact is that the 30 per cent reduction, or a 10 per cent reduction a year over three years, must be a net reduction. Under the United States proposal any production which is permitted in a category must be compensated by the destruction of sufficient additional armaments in that category to ensure that the 30 per cent reduction in that category is maintained. The provisions that cover this matter are found in clauses (1) and (2) of sub-paragraph b of paragraph 3 of article A of the United States draft, and they are of such importance that I should like to read them:

"(1) any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore

"(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater, the destructive capability of any such armaments produced within a category would be compensated for by the destruction of sufficient armaments within that category to the end that the ten per cent reduction in destructive capability as well as numbers in each of these categories in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved." (ENDC/30, page 6 and Corr.1)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

It may be noted that the criterion of destructive capability -- and the requirement that it be not increased above the levels reduced by 30 per cent due to continued production -- is proposed only with respect to the first two categories. These categories include armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 15,000 kilogrammes or greater and missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater. This does not, let me assure the Committee, indicate a closed mind on the criterion of destructive capability as applied to the other categories. It merely indicates that the United States believes it might be possible to come up with a fairly simple measure of destructive capability in these first two categories, but so far in our studies we have not been sufficiently optimistic about a measure of destructive capability in the other categories. But as I have indicated, we are studying this matter; we are open to suggestions on this subject, and if any other members of the Conference have any ideas on how this concept could be applied to the remaining eight categories, we would be very happy to hear them. Our purpose is, through the application of this further limitation within categories, to assure that no imbalance occurs in the three-year period during which a minimal amount of production under strict international control is retained.

I regret that my statement has been so detailed, but this is a very complicated subject. I am afraid it will be necessary for us all to make these somewhat detailed and careful comparisons in order to be sure that we grasp the significant points in the Soviet draft and in the United States draft and also the substantial differences between the two drafts. I expect to continue tomorrow my exposition of the differences between the two drafts.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): We have listened with great interest to what the representative of the United States has said in explanation and expansion of the provisions contained in the first stage of the United States draft treaty.

I should like at this time to revert to the discussion that we had yesterday on the section of the draft agreement on general and complete disarmament covered by article 3 of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2) and the corresponding parts of the United States draft (ENDC/30).

From the final discussion yesterday on procedure, the Canadian delegation understands that what will eventually emerge as this section of the draft agreement will be a summary in general terms of the most important commitments to be made in

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

regard to disarmament. The Canadian delegation does not object to using the term "general obligations", but on the understanding that the real and definite obligations to which the parties will bind themselves will be set forth precisely, definitely and in detail in the substantive articles which will subsequently be agreed upon.

We understand that it was decided yesterday that the co-Chairmen should combine the texts of the Soviet Union and the United States covering this subject matter, taking account of the views expressed by other members of the Committee, which are to be submitted in writing by Friday.

In the meantime the Canadian delegation would like to make a few observations on the content of this part of the proposed joint draft. Article 3, paragraph 1 (a), of the Soviet draft appears to us to be a briefer statement of what is contained in paragraph 12 of the draft preamble which has been agreed between the co-Chairmen, and which reads as follows:

"Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good neighbourliness, equality, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all States;"

(ENDC/L.11/Rev.1, page 2)

The Canadian delegation would prefer to see paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 redrafted, using as nearly as possible the same wording as that agreed to in paragraph 12 of the preamble.

With reference to paragraph 1 (b) of the Soviet text, we should prefer language similar to that in section H, paragraph 1, of the United States draft treaty combined with the language of paragraph 3 (a) of that section of the United States treaty. I will read out a suggested text:

"to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type -- including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare -- contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter".

And another sub-paragraph could be added as follows:

"to utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other State, whether or not a party to the treaty, including negotiation, enquiry, mediation,

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice".

We are in agreement with the present wording of paragraph 1 (c) of the Soviet draft.

As for the second paragraph of this article, while we are naturally not opposed to the idea contained in it, we think it should be possible to express it in a positive rather than in a negative sense. In any case we think that the expression "in any manner" should be replaced by the words "for any purpose", and that the expression "the safeguarding of the internal security of States" could be better expressed as "the assurance of their own internal security", because under the present wording these police or militia contingents could apparently be used for the internal security of some other States -- which I am sure was not the intention of the drafters of the article.

I should like to make an observation regarding the use of the word "contingents". My understanding of this word in the military sense means the contribution of various parties to a common force. For example, several of the nations represented here have supplied contingents of troops to the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Congo Force. But troops which belong to a nation and stay within the nation would not normally be described as "contingents". I say that simply in passing.

As we remarked in relation to article 2 of the Soviet draft treaty, we do not in any way imply that the language which is set down here and the amendments we suggest should necessarily emerge as the final draft, because, according to our agreed procedure, the final draft must be worked out in a co-operative effort by the co-Chairmen.

Mr. LALL (India): I have several sets of remarks to make today arising out of the various matters that have been touched upon by the representatives of the United States and Canada.

First, the United States representative mentioned that his delegation -- and I believe the United Kingdom delegation -- would suggest that the eight sponsors of the joint memorandum agreed to choose two or three of their membership to join the work of the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests. On this point I can make only a very

(Mr. Lall, India)

preliminary comment as we have not yet heard from the two other members of the Sub-Committee. In any event, so far as the Indian delegation is concerned, we would like to know a little more about this suggestion and if it is supported by all three members of the Sub-Committee. In particular, may I say that we appreciate the implied and, indeed, explicit serious approach of the United States delegation to the joint memorandum? -- that is to say that, so far as the United States delegation is concerned, we take this to indicate full seriousness of approach to the suggestions contained in the joint memorandum. For that, the delegation of India is grateful. We feel that here is the possibility of progress towards the solution of the problem of nuclear testing.

In that connexion I am instructed, on behalf of the Indian delegation, to say this to the Conference: while the countries primarily concerned are giving consideration to the joint memorandum, for a relatively short period, a few weeks perhaps -- and this would avoid any misunderstanding in terms of whether or not it is a moratorium, or whether or not we describe "moratorium" in a legalistic sense -- we would appeal to those countries not to undertake any testing of nuclear weapons. I am instructed to say this to the Conference, and I do so with a full sense of the seriousness of the present situation and all that it means and implies to our world today.

I now pass to another set of remarks which arise from the statement which the United States representative made today and in which he gave us the further thinking of the United States regarding the new United States plan in document ENDC/30. First, may I say to Mr. Dean that we were not at all bored or put off by the details that he supplied to us? On the contrary, we will clearly require further details from the United States and are ready to absorb them and consider them carefully. In fact, it is surprising what a capacity for detail one does have; and I can assure the representative of the United States that that capacity is nowhere near satisfied yet.

May I turn to certain remarks he made about production which were most important, interesting and complicated? He read out to us certain provisions relating to the production of armaments. I am referring to the two provisions which he mentioned towards the end of his statement. One begins "any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category". (ENDC/30, page 6) The second deals with the case

(Mr. Lall, India)

of armed combat aircraft of certain categories. In both these provisions, and certainly in the second, the question of destructive capability is raised.

The representative of the United States went on to point out that the United States was referring to destructive capability in two types of weapons; he said that so far as other categories were concerned they had an open mind, they would like to think about the matter, and so on. If we restrict this question of balancing on the basis of destructive capability to the two categories to which the United States has hitherto been able so to relate it, there remains obviously a vast array of weapons and systems of destruction in which this balancing process is left in the air and unresolved. Therefore this question of production on the basis of retaining a balance of destructive capability becomes very obscure indeed.

On the other hand, if some practical means is found of extending the balancing of destructive capability to all categories of weapons at the very first stage of disarmament both sides -- if I may be excused for using that simplified term to describe the situation -- would have to reveal all their destructive capability, that is to say, the destructive capability of all their weapon systems. Is that realistic? Is that going to happen? It seems to me at this stage -- and I must say I am making preliminary remarks -- that the system of production checks which is contained in the United States paper leads to one or other of two unsatisfactory conclusions.

One possible conclusion is that the range of weapons in which it was not possible to work out the destructive capability vis-à-vis the weapons of the other side would be so great that the whole picture would be extremely blurred and distorted, and therefore this would be of no practical use.

The second possible conclusion is that both sides would have to reveal fully the destructive capability of their weapon systems. That, I think is unrealistic. So how is this to be solved? That is the question which arises in my mind, and I do not see that either conclusion in the United States paper is satisfactory.

A possible solution, which I trust will be considered by both sides, might be as follows. Why should there be any production at all except for spare parts during the progress of the disarmament plan? If the disarmament plan and treaty which we eventually adopt is one that will work with reasonable speed, then surely it should be possible to have no production at all of weapons except spare parts. Perhaps at the end of stage I production could cease except for spare parts. This

(Mr. Lall, India)

would make it possible for all of us to dismantle all production facilities of weapon systems, except those which could be shown to be necessary for the production of spare parts.

It seems to me that that would be a simple, practical, verifiable arrangement regarding the production of weapons of various categories. We would be very grateful to hear from both sides -- more specifically, from the United States and the Soviet Union -- whether they do not think that this sort of arrangement regarding production, which could begin towards the end of stage I of the plan, would be feasible and would be the best way of dealing with the production of armaments and war material throughout the progress of the disarmament plan.

Now I come to the third and final set of remarks which I should like to make today. These remarks relate to the statement made by the representative of Canada. We were grateful that he took matters further in consideration of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. We listened with interest to his comments on article 3 of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2) and on the corresponding part of the United States draft.

I find myself in agreement with what Mr. Burns said about paragraph 1(a) of the Soviet text. On paragraph 1(b) Mr. Burns referred us to the relevant portions of the United States document -- pages 17 and 18. We have looked at these, and we find they are based on Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

So far as the delegation of India is concerned, we should prefer the clause dealing with this matter in our treaty to read neither as in the United States document nor as in the Soviet Union document. We should prefer it to say that the States parties would settle disputes among themselves in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Why do we prefer this formulation? For the very simple and, we feel, good and cogent reason that we are all Members of the United Nations; this is a universal body; we ought to be bound by the treaty of the United Nations, namely, the Charter; and it is best not to proliferate overlapping agreements of this kind when we are already bound by an existing agreement of great weight and substance. So we should prefer to say that we would be bound in this matter of disputes by Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

We also found ourselves in agreement with what the representative of Canada said about the wording of paragraph 2 of article 3 in the Soviet draft. We think that the changes he suggested would make the meaning much clearer and would not



(Mr. Lall, India)

alter the sense of the paragraph as drafted; and I do not think anyone would particularly disagree with the sense of that paragraph.

Personally, I am not very sure that this treaty could bind all of us to strengthen the United Nations in accordance with the wording proposed. Amendments to the United Nations Charter must be made under the processes contained in the Charter, and I am not sure that it is good law to sign a treaty saying that we will amend another treaty -- because that is what, in effect, this amounts to -- when that other treaty or Charter has its own processes for amendments and alterations. I raise this point because I think that some modification in the language here is required, not so much in the sense as in the form. This refers not only to paragraph 1 (c) of article 3 of the Soviet text but also to paragraphs H3, 4 and 5 of the relevant part of the United States text. We would wish to examine this matter of wording later, when we come to the detailed consideration of that part of the treaty and when we have been given a joint text by the co-Chairmen, which we hope will be in the next few days.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): We of the Swedish delegation have listened with the utmost interest to the important statements which have been made here this morning. At this stage I wish to confine my remarks, as did the representative of Canada, to certain issues within the purview of our introductory articles, and I will try to carry on from where he left off.

I refer specifically to the question concerning a United Nations force to police the peace in a disarmed world. Passages concerning this matter are contained in paragraph 2 of article 3 of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2), and also in paragraph 2 of article 1. In the United States draft (ENDC/30) reference to this matter is made in paragraph 4, under A "Objectives". It is our contention that in both these cases the language used to deal with this matter is considerably more specific than in the other statements which in the introductory chapters attempt to summarize some general principles.

I should like to turn first to the Soviet draft. In paragraph 2 of article 3 it is stated that the States parties to the treaty should have at their disposal contingents of police necessary for the discharge of their obligations to maintain international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

While we have no great objection to this wording, we find that what is stated in paragraph 2 of article 1 goes considerably further. In this paragraph it is stated not only that the contingents would be equipped with light firearms, but that they should discharge their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and "under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty".

I should like to raise two points concerning this wording. My first point is a general and formal one. I think the whole Committee would agree with us that the introduction of the specific reference to a subsequent article of the draft treaty in this introductory paragraph is unwieldy and unpractical. It would be hard for us to subscribe to this.

In perusing the verbatim records of the period when I was not here, I find that this question was touched upon by Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, at the twelfth meeting on 30 March, when he stated:

"I would only say, with respect to the question of drafting, that this is the only reference to a specific article, as I see it, in article 1. I believe that it is not advisable in a summary article appearing at the beginning of a text to refer to any article specifically by number".

(ENDC/PV.12, page 34)

It seems to me that the representative of Bulgaria practically agreed that there should be some change in this paragraph when he stated at the same meeting:

"But what is to prevent us from referring to another article in article 1, paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft? We need not specify the number; we could simply refer to the article concerning the United Nations Peace Force. It would not even be necessary to mention any particular article; that will certainly be done later. Are we against having a United Nations Force? Certainly not. What will it consist of? We are not going to specify that in article 1, paragraph 2; we shall do it later." (ENDC/PV.12, page 37)

I do think that this is very sound advice, and that we ought to suggest that some change be made here -- that is, to simplify and shorten the paragraph. However, I also have a very specific reason for recommending such a change, one which certainly refers to the position of my country, and I think to the position of the non-aligned countries as a whole.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

Paragraph 2 of article 37 of the Soviet draft states:

"The command of the units referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made up of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation". (ENDC/2, page 24)

Now I do not need to reiterate that we are not interested in being classed together as a group. I think it would not be wise in the disarmament treaty to make any kind of comparison, across the board, of the countries which do not belong to either of the two sides. The Canadian representative raised the same objection yesterday in relation to another article, and I should like to subscribe wholeheartedly to what he said. I would prefer that we avoid at all times any phraseology that lumps together the non-aligned countries in a bloc which they do not wish to form.

For these two reasons, one general and formal and the other specific and relating more to substance, I do not find this wording in the Soviet draft serviceable for the purposes of an introduction to our treaty.

I should now like to turn to the United States draft, where we find parallel provisions in paragraph 4, under "Objectives". It is stated there:

"To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, States also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms". (ENDC/30, page 2)

On the whole, that would seem better to meet the general requirements of such an introductory statement -- at least with regard to the final stage of disarmament. However, I must admit that the words "during ... implementation" create some difficulty as regards interpretation and as regards subscribing to them now, before we have discussed stages I and II of this plan.

Also, to spell out that there should be a United Nations Peace Force -- with capital letters -- goes a little further than what we have discussed earlier in regard to this matter, and it points up the difference of opinion between the two sides. Both the Soviet Union draft and the United States draft, as a matter of fact, go considerably beyond the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) on this particular point. That surprises me a little in regard to the United States position, because, according to the verbatim records of the fifteenth meeting on 4 April, the Chairman of the United States delegation, Mr. Dean, said in referring to this very important

(Mrs. Lyrdal, Sweden)

matter -- and he had an earlier version of the (ENDC/13) outline before him then -- that they had drawn that statement in their "Objectives" from the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. He said:

"It is intended to make clear what objective the treaty must ensure with respect to the armaments remaining to States." (ENDC/PV.15, page 36)

In that earlier draft the phrase in question reads:

"and that States will support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force".

"Peace force" appears there without capital letters.

Such a measured statement seems to correspond better to the kind of position we would want to take on this point. What has happened is that, by the various statements we now have before us, the controversial issues have been brought more into the foreground than they should be. Of course we are all familiar with the historical background of the sharp divergence of views on this question: how Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and its Article 43 have never been implemented, and how instead ad hoc measures have been taken by the United Nations. Recourse has been had to extraordinary emergency forces. They have not been equipped for combat but used only as police forces, and they have been sent to countries with the consent of these. We have found these to be expedient and necessary actions on the part of the United Nations. My country has participated in these actions, and done so even with some sacrifice.

But the question of principle is far from resolved, and I think it would be premature to try to resolve it by a stroke of the pen right here when we are dealing with the introductory part of the whole treaty. The question will need profound study. I think we shall have to devote long and perhaps even rather tortuous study to the substance of this very question. We all look forward to a future when there will be some kind of international or United Nations force to keep order in the world, but to try to spell things out as in the too detailed provisions I have just referred to will, I think, only hamper progress in drafting.

I would summarize my conclusions by saying that we would appeal to the two co-Chairmen, when they take on the job of amalgamating those articles, to try and reduce these texts to the commonly-acceptable minimum. We would be very glad to try our hand at drafting some amendment, if that would be helpful. However, if no

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

amendment really strikes the happy medium; I think the best thing to do would be to revert to the statement contained in the Agreed Principles that States shall provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened closely to the views expressed today by a number of speakers and to the proposals made on various issues that have been under discussion today. I propose to deal with some of the points raised today by the United States representative, after which I shall make a more detailed statement explaining our position on article 3 of our draft treaty, on which comments have also been made by the representatives of Canada, India and Sweden.

As we have agreed to conclude the examination of part I of the draft treaty this week, I think that explanatory statements on that subject will be useful. But, to begin with, I have a few words to say about Mr. Dean's proposal concerning negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. Dean has put forward as a United States proposal, which apparently has the support of the United Kingdom representative, that one, two or three representatives of non-aligned countries should be invited to work with the three-Power Sub-Committee. At the same time he said it was not clear to him why the Soviet Union representative has not associated himself with the proposal. But I find this statement rather surprising, because at yesterday's meeting of the three-Power Sub-Committee Mr. Dean heard a very clear statement by the Soviet Union representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, which is to be found in the record of the meeting. The United States representative heard this statement, and it seems to me that our position should have been clear to him.

As the United States representative has said that he does not understand the position of the Soviet Union, I will read out a passage from the record in which Mr. Tsarapkin explains our position. I apologize to representatives for reading out a rather long passage, but I feel compelled to do so in view of the United States representative's statement that he is not aware of our position.

Mr. Tsarapkin said yesterday:

"With regard to the suggested participation of non-aligned countries, we are in favour of this. So far from opposing it, we pressed for the inclusion of non-aligned States in the Disarmament Committee. We upheld

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

and defended this idea, and we are gratified that non-aligned States are now co-operating with us in the consideration of disarmament problems. We are also in favour of non-aligned States considering problems of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It was at your (the United States representative's) suggestion that the three-Power Sub-Committee composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union was set up. It was at your suggestion, not ours.

"We agreed to it, and we are now discussing in it the cessation of tests. You wish the discussion of this matter to take place among a larger number of participants, to invite non-aligned States to take part. We warmly support this. We certainly cannot agree that it is not due to us that a Disarmament Committee with eight non-aligned States among its members is considering the questions before us. We believe that this is due to the Soviet Union and the position it has adopted. But you now apparently for some reason wish to cut down the number of non-aligned States to be given an opportunity of taking part in the discussion of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and to enlarge the Sub-Committee by two or three. We will not accept such a reduction. We will not agree to it. Why should a particular group of non-aligned States be excluded? Why should some States take part and others not? On what grounds? How are we to decide which non-aligned States are to be invited and which are to be excluded from participation in the Sub-Committee's work -- by drawing lots or by playing pitch-and-toss? It would be wrong to divide the non-aligned States into two groups, one worthy to take part in the Sub-Committee's work and the other not. The worthy would attend the Sub-Committee's meetings, while the unworthy would wait in the Disarmament Committee until the question came back to it. This would be wrong and, I think, even be insulting to the non-aligned States which were excluded. Everything considered, this proposal smacks to us of discrimination towards some non-aligned States, and therefore unacceptable."

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.1C, p. 32-33).

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

That is what the representative of the Soviet Union said yesterday. The United States is aware of this position, and I therefore cannot understand why the United States representative should have said today that the reasons for the Soviet Union's position are not clear to him.

In this connexion I should also like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the statement made on behalf of the eight non-aligned States by the representative of Ethiopia at the meeting of the Committee on 19 April. Mr. Sahlou, the Ethiopian representative, told us at that meeting:

"It may be that it would now be the wish of the nuclear Powers to ask us to co-operate with them in some or all aspects of new negotiations. We shall willingly and gladly be of any service that we can in this regard. We should also be prepared to make scientific collaboration available to the best of our ability.

"At this juncture, before we have any clear indication from the three countries concerned regarding their willingness to start anew on the basis of the joint memorandum, we believe that the memorandum has to be interpreted not by us, but by you, the three nuclear Powers. This, we feel, is the most useful approach for all parties concerned. I will go one step further and say that, even if we were in a position to answer all your questions, we think this would prejudice the eventual solutions to such an extent or in such a way that agreement on these very solutions would become more difficult to attain". (ENDC/PV.24, p.6)

That is what the representative of Ethiopia said on behalf of all the eight States. I am to say that the Soviet delegation fully agrees with this standpoint of the eight non-aligned States, as expressed by the representative of Ethiopia.

We have now reached a stage where the Soviet Union, as we know, has announced its acceptance of the proposals contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States as a basis for further negotiations. We have heard statements here by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in which they said that they accept this proposal as one of the bases. As has become clear from yesterday's discussion of this question, the United States and the United Kingdom are now attempting to place their own interpretation on this proposal by the non-aligned States. They are attempting to prove that this proposal in fact

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

reflects the position which the United States and the United Kingdom representatives have taken since the beginning of the negotiations and, more particularly, the positions they took in their proposals of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9).

It is, of course, quite obvious that such an interpretation distorts the entire position set out in the proposal of the eight non-aligned States. As the representatives of those countries have themselves explained quite fully in this Committee, they occupy a compromise position, lying between the positions taken by the representatives of the Western Powers and the representative of the Soviet Union. That is how we understand this proposal, and it seems to me that there can be no two opinions on the matter.

The attempt now being made to give the impression that the proposal of the eight non-aligned States is to all intents and purposes the position of the Western Powers is, of course, ridiculous. It merely shows the difficult situation in which the United States and the United Kingdom find themselves because they do not wish to switch to a new position, because they are clinging to their old, extreme position which cannot yield agreement and are now trying to adapt the new proposal, submitted as a compromise by the non-aligned States, to their own requirements. I think there is no need to demonstrate the groundlessness of such a position and, I would say, the impropriety of the line which the representatives of the Western Powers are taking in the discussion of this question.

We have all been present at the last two days' discussions, and we have all heard statements of the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom on this matter. It was clear to all of us that the United States and the United Kingdom do not wish to accept the compromise position proposed by the eight non-aligned States as a basis. And now that they see that an absolute majority of the Committee is in favour of attempting to reach agreement on the basis of this compromise position, they are trying to interpret the proposal virtually as an expression of their own point of view and are again resorting to attempts to impose their old position as the basis for agreement. It is obvious that no agreement of any kind is possible on such a basis.

Therefore the actual proposal which has just been made by the United States representative should, I think, be viewed in the light of these manoeuvres by the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of the discontinuance of tests. It is a question of their attempting to invite two or three representatives of



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

non-aligned States and of trying in the Sub-Committee, with the help of these two or three States, to make certain changes in the eight-nation memorandum itself, to place their own interpretation on it so as to create a situation in which they can stand by their old positions. This is the political meaning of this proposal. It is purely and simply a manoeuvre to conceal the policy of thwarting any agreement on the discontinuance of tests, the policy of resuming tests which was announced yesterday in Washington. This has again been confirmed despite the fact that the representatives of the non-aligned States have provided a new basis for agreement and that this basis has been accepted by the Soviet Union.

It is with a view to concealing their policy of resuming tests and thwarting agreement that the United States and the United Kingdom are now resorting to these manoeuvres, designed to create the impression that they are anxious to reach an agreement of some kind and even to reach it with the help, if you please, representatives of non-aligned States. These manoeuvres cannot now deceive anyone. As was clearly shown in the statement by the Soviet Government of 19 April (ENDC/32), the purpose of the whole position of the United States and the United Kingdom is to justify those countries in some way before the peoples of the world, to try to shift to someone else the blame for the inflexible and unacceptable position which they are now maintaining in the negotiations for reaching agreement on the discontinuance of tests and in regard to the resumption of the tests themselves.

The Indian representative made a statement today on the instructions of his Government in which he said that it appealed to all the nuclear Powers not to undertake any testing of nuclear weapons while the eight-nation memorandum is under consideration. This appeal, which was made yesterday in Parliament by the Prime Minister of India, has been virtually rejected by the United States. This merely shows that at present no appeals to discontinue tests and to achieve a mutually-acceptable agreement seem to be favourably received by the Government of the United States, which has decided on the course of further competition in nuclear weapons. This is the actual position of the United States.

Clearly no good will come of this course. No good will come of this policy, either to the work of our Committee or Sub-Committee or to the international situation as a whole. The nuclear weapons race, which has again been revived by the United States, will inevitably lead to a sharp deterioration in the international situation, and all States, including the Soviet Union, will draw the appropriate conclusions from this.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

These are the comments I wished to make on the statement by the United States representative concerning the invitation of non-aligned States. We are in favour of the entire question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests being discussed by the full Committee. We are opposed to discriminating against any country participating in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We consider that all questions which can now be discussed by the nuclear Powers, if all these Powers accept the eight-nation memorandum as a basis, should be discussed in the three-Power Sub-Committee, and that the results of this discussion should be studied by the full Disarmament Committee with the participation of all the eight non-aligned States. That is our position.

Now I wish to say a few words about the observations and comments made by the United States representative in explaining the United States proposal submitted on 18 April (ENDC/30 and Corr.1)

I shall not deal with all Mr. Dean's detailed explanations. I think we can take up all these details when we come to discuss the specific measures of disarmament and control connected with the first, second or third stage of disarmament. We shall go into all these questions more fully then. I should, however, like to make one comment with reference to the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union of which it seems to me the United States representative gave an entirely incorrect assessment both yesterday and today.

Both yesterday and today he said for some reason that the Soviet Union draft treaty provided for only limited and unspecified cuts in other armaments -- in conventional armaments. That is how I took down today's statement by Mr. Dean. He expressed the same idea yesterday. An attempt was made to give the impression that the United States programme contained concrete proposals for a 30 per cent reduction in all categories of armaments and armed forces, whereas the programme of the Soviet Union provides for limited and unspecified cuts in conventional armaments. But I consider that this is an entirely incorrect and distorted interpretation of the proposals contained in the specific articles of the Soviet draft treaty. While I do not think there is any need to go into the matter in any detail, I must point out that the contents of the relevant paragraphs of the Soviet draft are quite unambiguous. I venture to remind you of some of the proposals in the Soviet draft treaty.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I would draw the attention of Committee members to article 11, which was mentioned by the United States representative. Article 11 refers quite clearly to specific reductions in the strength of armed forces and to the destruction of conventional armaments. It states:

"1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America - 1,700,000 enlisted men, .....

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - 1,700,000 enlisted men ...." (ENDC/2, pp. 9-10)

The article continues:

"(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this Article)" (ibid, p.10)

This is my first point. In view of the detailed indications given in the draft treaty, I cannot understand why anyone should speak of unspecified and limited cuts. As we know, the first reduction proposed in the United States draft is a reduction to 2.1 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union proposes a reduction to 1.7 million. Is that a limited or unspecified cut? Anyone can see at a glance that we propose a more drastic reduction in conventional armed forces than is proposed by the United States. Why then do you talk in this way? Why do you try to give the impression that we are in favour of a smaller, a more limited reduction in armed forces? We are nothing of the kind. You propose a limited reduction of armed forces to 2.1 million men. But we propose a more drastic reduction during the very first stage, namely to 1.7 million men.

Let us take the question of the reduction and destruction of armaments a stage further. Article 11, paragraph 3, of the draft treaty states:

"All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units ....." -

in other words, of those to be reduced. There is to be a cut of some 1 million men under our programme and yours and all the armaments of these 1 million men -

"shall be destroyed ...." (ibid, p.10)

This is laid down in black and white in paragraph 3. Then why do you say that it is not clear, that there is something unspecified and limited about the reduction of armaments and armed forces? Why do you say this? Surely it is clearly stipulated that:

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"... conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions ... shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed". (ibid, p.10)

In other words, we propose that everything intended for the reserve forces, for that part of the armed forces that would provide reinforcements for these 1 million men, shall also be destroyed; this applies to both conventional armaments and equipment. What is unspecified about that? Everything is clearly specified and is on a much larger scale than your proposals.

Paragraph 4 provides that:

"Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc." (ibid, p.10)

What is unspecified about that? What is limited about that? It seems to me that this kind of approach to the interpretation of our position obviously does not merit serious consideration. But I am compelled to make a reply, because I see that the United States representative is attempting to distort our position. That is why in order to re-establish the truth I have no alternative but to read out a document which is in the possession of all of you, including the United States delegation. We shall deal with this question in greater detail when we come to consider the concrete plan of disarmament measures which we propose for the first stage of disarmament.

I shall now pass on to a third question which was referred to in the discussion today and yesterday and on which views were expressed, as I have already said, by the representatives of Canada, India and Sweden. This is the question of article 3 of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union which is now under consideration.

In accordance with its established procedure of work, the Committee has already had an opportunity of exchanging views on the main parts of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, namely on the preamble and on articles defining the obligations of States with respect to disarmament and control over disarmament. In order to make further progress towards accomplishing the task assigned to the

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Committee, we must also discuss article 3 of the treaty, which deals with the obligations of States to maintain peace and security in the course of and after general and complete disarmament.

It will be recalled that the need to guarantee the security of States during disarmament is provided for in the Agreed Principles approved by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session, in which it is pointed out that general and complete disarmament will be

"accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter".

(ENDC/5, p.1)

It is obvious that the best way of guaranteeing peace and the security of States would be to implement disarmament measures themselves. I doubt whether anyone could seriously dispute this proposition. Once the means of waging war have been destroyed and States have neither armies nor weapons, the danger of any recurrence of aggression will disappear. No State will be in a position to start a war if it lacks the means of waging it. Furthermore, during the execution of general and complete disarmament and after its completion, the control organs will exercise supervision with a view to ensuring that all States meticulously comply with their obligations under the disarmament treaty and cannot create a threat to the security of any State or States. Simultaneously with the implementation of the disarmament measures themselves, which is the main guarantee of the maintenance of peace and of the security of States, we must also think out supplementary measures and procedures which would facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes between States.

Under the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted for the Committee's consideration by the Soviet Union, States would undertake to settle all disputes and outstanding questions solely by peaceful means, making the widest possible use of the appropriate procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter. Provision is also made for the strengthening in every possible way of the United Nations, which at present is the principal international institution for promoting the development of peaceful co-operation among States and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I should like to say incidentally that what the Indian representative has said today, namely that we must be guided by the provisions of the United Nations Charter and must not attempt to draw up new provisions which would compete with the provisions of the Charter, is in my view quite correct and merits careful consideration.

Article 3, paragraph 1, of the treaty on general and complete disarmament contains the following provisions relating to this matter:

"1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament:

(a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly co-existence and co-operation;

(b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use to these ends the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

(c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means." (ENDC/2, p.4)

These provisions of the draft treaty express the generally-recognized requirement that, in conditions of disarmament, States should base their mutual relations on peaceful coexistence, should not resort to force or the threat of force, and should apply the procedures prescribed in the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of existing disputes and outstanding issues. And in order to ensure that there is every opportunity for the widest possible application of these procedures, States must strengthen the United Nations.

The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union provides (in article 1) that States will have, "... upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms, and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security ..." (ibid, p.2)

In this connexion, it is most important that a treaty on general and complete disarmament should stipulate that the contingents of police (militia) remaining at the disposal of States shall not be used in a manner contrary to peace, in the selfish or narrowly-interpreted interests of some States and in a manner detrimental

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

to peace and to the international security of States. Therefore article 3, paragraph 2, of the proposal submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union contains the following very important provision:

"The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia), remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament, in any manner other than for the safeguarding of the internal security of States or for the discharge of their obligations to maintain international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter" (ibid., p.4)

There is no need to emphasize the importance of including such provisions in the treaty.

We will, of course, study the views expressed on this article by the representatives of Canada and Sweden, as well as by the representative of India, who I believe also said something on this subject. But since no objections were raised to the basic ideas set out in the article, it seems to me that we can find an acceptable wording for each of its provisions.

The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union to the Eighteen-Nation Committee provides for specific measures to strengthen international peace and security, to be carried out during the various stages of the implementation of the treaty. Thus article 18 of the draft treaty provides that States parties to the treaty shall, between the signing of the treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided for in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. Article 18 specifies that:

"The armed forces provided under the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the corresponding States and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength, equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, commanded by the military authorities of the corresponding States, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council" (ENDC/2, p.13).

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The implementation of these provisions of article 18 will create effective means for the defence of States against aggression and against any threat of breaches of the peace by any State or group of States. The application of this important provision will greatly strengthen the United Nations, which was set up for the maintenance of peace and the security of all States and all peoples.

In this connexion, I cannot leave unanswered a remark made by the representative of Sweden, who said that agreement had not yet been reached on the use of the armed forces of different States by the Security Council under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. She said (and I believe the Canadian representative also touched on this point) that United Nations forces have had to be set up on an emergency basis and, as I understood the position, outside the framework of Article 43 -- in other words, outside the framework of the Charter. She said that there are, of course, differences of principle on this matter between a number of States. I must, however, confess that it was not clear to me how the representative of Sweden proposes that we should act in future, whether we should act according to the spirit of the United Nations Charter or in breach of it. If she means the latter, then of course our views are completely at variance with those of the delegations of Sweden and of other countries. We shall adhere firmly and consistently to the United Nations Charter, and we maintain that the experience gained during the last few years clearly shows that any breach of the United Nations Charter, particularly in the setting-up of armed forces, is fraught with very serious consequences for the particular countries where such forces operate and for peace in general. I think that the Swedish delegation and the Swedish Government in particular should bear in mind the unfortunate experience of using United Nations armed forces otherwise than in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament will radically alter the international situation and establish all the necessary conditions for implementing the important provisions of the United Nations Charter under which military agreements are to be concluded between the Security Council and Members of the United Nations. The conclusion of such agreements would undoubtedly be a significant advance in the organization of collective measures and in the provision of safeguards against acts of aggression or any international developments that would aggravate international relations and create a threat to peace and security.



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Another important problem which must be considered and settled at a later stage of our work on a treaty on general and complete disarmament is the procedure for using contingents of police (militia) for security purposes. A situation cannot be permitted to arise in which an international force would be used contrary to the interests of world peace and security and to the interests of all States. Provisions must be included in the treaty which would prevent international contingents from being used in the interests of any State or group of States or the command of such forces being organized on a unilateral basis that would not guarantee the maintenance of peace and security for all States and peoples of the world.

During the discussion of article 3 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament prepared by the Soviet Union, reference has so far been made only to the most general points of principle that are to determine the general obligations of the parties to the treaty for the maintenance of international peace and security in the course of and after the completion of general and complete disarmament. I understood from the statement by the Canadian representative that the Canadian delegation generally agrees that the most general obligations in this field should be defined. I doubt if any delegation will object to this. There is, of course, no need at present to examine this question in detail or to define all the measures for maintaining peace and security for whose implementation we must provide at each stage of disarmament. We will revert to these questions when we are dealing with the individual stages of disarmament and with the specific articles relating to this matter.

With regard to the problem of safeguarding security under conditions of disarmament, we should point out that we have doubts about a number of provisions designed to maintain peace which have been put forward by the United States in the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30). We find certain of these provisions totally unacceptable.

For instance, in the document to which I have just referred the United States raises the question of establishing a United Nations Peace Force, although, as we know, Article 43 of the United Nations Charter merely provides that Members of the United Nations shall make armed forces available to the Security Council, and does not contain provisions concerning the establishment of an independent United Nations force.

(Mr. Zorin, USSE)

We consider that, in raising this question of establishing a United Nations Peace Force, the United States is attempting to bypass the Security Council in regard to the use of armed forces made available to the Security Council under the United Nations Charter.

We pointed out yesterday that in section H, sub-paragraph 5b, of the United States document one of the measures for keeping the peace is defined as follows:

"Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter". (ENDC/30, p.18)

However, as we pointed out yesterday, the next sub-paragraph, 5c, in section E lays down a function that is clearly at variance with the United Nations Charter. It reads:

"Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments". (ibid.)

Thus the United States is in fact proposing that a United Nations Peace Force should be established without reference to the Security Council, and consequently in violation of the United Nations Charter. In other words, the United States considers that the provisions of the Charter require examination, yet it suggests that a proposal which constitutes a clear violation of the Charter should be carried into effect without any examination.

The way in which the United States has dealt with the question of a United Nations Peace Force in its document not only conflicts with the United Nations Charter, but also with the Agreed Principles on disarmament, which emphasize that arrangements for the maintenance of peace must be in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The United States raises other issues - the compulsory referral by States of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty to the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in such disputes, the establishment of a so-called "United Nations Peace Observation Corps", and the development of rules of international conduct. All these questions go beyond the scope both of the United Nations Charter and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

A few words about the proposal to establish a United Nations Peace Observation Corps. As we know, under the Charter, in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But the United States proposal to establish a Peace Observation Corps is intended to bypass the Security Council and to prevent it from fulfilling a basic function assigned to it under the Charter.

It may well be asked why the United States pays lip service to the need to strengthen the United Nations, but in practice proposes measures which can only undermine and violate the principles of the Charter and create a situation that would pave the way for the domination and control of the United Nations by a certain group of Powers which still occupy a predominant position in the machinery of the organization.

The Soviet Union and other States interested in strengthening the United Nations as an organization for international co-operation on a footing of equality cannot, of course, agree to the creation of a situation which would permit the United Nations Charter to be violated. To put forward demands of this kind is nothing more or less than to set obstacles in the path of general and complete disarmament.

The United States goes on to raise the question of drawing up and developing some compulsory rules of international conduct, which would become effective unless a majority of the parties to the treaty signified their disapproval. We should like to ask the United States delegation on the basis of which principle of the United Nations Charter the United States proposes to establish compulsory rules of international conduct that would be dictated by some parties to the treaty to other parties. Why is the United States dissatisfied with the United Nations Charter, which already sets out established rules of international conduct, and also encourages the progressive development and codification of international law?

One is bound to conclude that the procedures and measures for the maintenance of peace and security which have been put forward by the United States are in accordance neither with the United Nations Charter nor with the Agreed Principles. As the representative of Sweden has rightly pointed out today, they go considerably beyond the Agreed Principles. This is undoubtedly the case.

We considered it necessary to go into these questions because they are dealt with at the very beginning of the United States document -- in paragraph 4 of section A, which is headed "Objectives".

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and measures for the maintenance of international peace and security in the course of and after the implementation of such disarmament. It hopes that the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee will make a constructive examination of the questions put forward in article 3 of the Soviet draft treaty, and will in turn put forward their own ideas, which would help us to comply with the United Nations Charter and to draft the provisions of this article in such a way as to strengthen international peace and the security of the peoples.

Mr. CVALETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation has listened with the greatest attention to all today's interesting statements on the proposals for general and complete disarmament -- statements which seem to me to provide further evidence of the spirit of collaboration that prevails at this Conference, despite the differences which naturally subsist at this stage of our work.

The reason why I asked to speak, however, is that, like the representative of India, I was particularly interested in the proposals which Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber made yesterday in the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, with a view to participation by the eight delegations that submitted the memorandum of 16 April, or some of them, in the Sub-Committee's work.

I myself would be entirely in favour of such participation, which could certainly be useful; but I understand that the proposal is meeting with difficulties. Mr. Zorin has just explained his reasons. I should like to point out, however, that if the eight delegations were all invited to take part in the Sub-Committee's work, the danger to which Mr. Zorin has just drawn our attention would not exist. The renewed failure of negotiations in the three-Power Sub-Committee naturally increases the Italian delegation's concern. But despite these failures we still believe, as you know, that we must try and try again, exploring all possible ways and means. The problem is too serious for us to leave any method untried.

In studying the question of nuclear tests, we have sometimes considered the political aspect and sometimes the technical aspect. In my opinion it is on the latter that the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April is mainly based. We should continue our study of the question, endeavouring to interpret the thought

(Mr. Cavaletti, Italy)

underlying this document as faithfully as possible. Here I fully agree with Mr. Zorin. That can only be done if we take the technical aspect of the memorandum as our guide. What does that document suggest? Paragraph 3 states that:

"They believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis" (ENDC/28).

I therefore consider that the memorandum should be examined in the light of that statement. The study which the document encourages us to make is, in fact, a purely scientific one. I therefore wish to propose that a group of scientific experts be appointed as soon as possible, including scientists of the three nuclear Powers and also scientists of the eight nations which submitted the memorandum. There would thus be no such discrimination as Mr. Zorin seems to fear.

The appointment of such a committee seems to me to be in full conformity with the letter and the spirit of the memorandum, and it could do extremely useful work in guiding the Conference in its decisions. I am well aware that the system of a committee of technical experts has already been tried without success. But the committee set up in the past consisted solely of experts of the nuclear Powers. The technical committee I propose would, on the contrary, be constituted on an entirely new basis, since it would also include experts of the eight non-nuclear nations which can, and should, make a valuable contribution, and wish to do so.

I believe the appointment of such a committee of experts has already been referred to during previous discussions. I think it was the United Kingdom delegation that spoke of it. In my opinion it was an excellent idea, which I should like to take up again and propose formally to the Conference now, in the hope of thus being able to find a way out of the difficulties we have got into.

This new effort of goodwill -- this new endeavour -- should not meet with objections from the eight delegations which submitted the memorandum. I know that at present they do not wish to interpret their document politically, and for my part I respect their wish. But what I am proposing is -- I repeat -- a purely technical study to find out whether, at the technical level, practical advantage could be taken of the suggestions contained in their memorandum, and if so how. So the eight delegations should not have any difficulties; on the contrary, they will no doubt be anxious to make this contribution.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I ask you, Mr. Chairman, if you and the Conference consider it useful, to submit to the two co-Chairmen the proposal I have just made on behalf of the Italian delegation, which could then be formulated in greater detail.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I wish to speak today on the question of international security in a disarmed world.

Article 3 of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union is a complex statement of the obligations of States in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security during and after the carrying out of general disarmament. This article gives expression to the principle stated in paragraph 7 of the Soviet-American Joint Statement of September 1961. According to that principle, progress in disarmament should be accompanied by the strengthening of measures for the maintenance of peace. The Soviet draft develops that principle, while taking into account both the objective necessities and the proposals on this subject put forward by other States.

Some of the ideas contained in this article are to be found in the opening sections of the United States document of 18 April, but there they are given very general treatment. We find more detailed provisions in subsequent sections of the American document. We intend to state our opinion on them in due course, when we come to discuss means of maintaining peace during the various stages of disarmament.

I can say at once, however, that we see in the American proposals a tendency to make disarmament measures depend on the establishment of a very complicated system of new institutions and, in fact, to subordinate disarmament to the prior application of these measures.

I will give only one example to illustrate this statement. It can be seen from the American draft that the United States is still sponsoring what is called the United Nations "Peace Force", in a manner entirely contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. As early as Stage II, when under the American plan disarmament would be limited and partial, new and permanent armed forces are to be established within the framework of the United Nations. In view of the difficulties which might arise in specifying how they are to be used -- which the United States draft does not do -- such forces might become an instrument in the hands of a group of States, directed against other States and threatening their sovereignty. Besides, there is nothing to show that those forces would be restricted in strength or

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

armaments. On the contrary, we read in the part concerning Stage III, in Section H, paragraph 3, that the Peace Force would have "sufficient armed forces and armaments" -- that means sufficiently large -- "so that no State could challenge it". (ENDC/30, page 32).

When to all this is added the principle of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and certain other measures provided for in the United States draft -- on which the Soviet Union representative has already spoken -- we must conclude that the American idea of how to ensure peace during disarmament differs appreciably from the Soviet draft and also from the principles of the United Nations Charter. The American concept is an attempt to establish a system which not only is not based on requirements for security in a disarmed world, but might become a means of limiting the sovereignty of some countries and hence a source of new tensions -- and that at a stage when the world was still far from being disarmed.

The socialist States stress the importance of the problem of ensuring security in a disarmed world and consider that it derives from the problem of disarmament. That is also the basis of the essential difference between the numerous plans put forward in the past and our approach to the problem. Taking a peaceful organization of the world as their objective, those former plans provided essentially for the establishment of new alliances which would involve the development of armaments. Some of those alliances were even clearly offensive in character. Such plans were doomed to failure for two reasons. In the first place, objective conditions for ensuring a lasting peace were lacking. These conditions have only now made their appearance; for it is only now that it has become possible effectively to eliminate war as an instrument of State policy. Secondly, the former plans left disarmament out of account in dealing with the problem, and accepted the existence of armed forces and armaments as an inevitable necessity. Those two factors determined the abstract nature of such plans, which were lacking in realism.

It is worth while recalling these facts, for even today we are witnessing trends which are an echo of those old ideas and, among other things, of the polemics of the period between the wars on the question which should come first, security or disarmament.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

And yet it is clear that every real disarmament measure leads of itself to a reduction in international tension and an increase in trust between States. Consequently, general and complete disarmament would exert a really positive influence on the development of international relations by eliminating, in principle, the possibility of disputes between States degenerating into war. During the process of disarmament the source of the cold war atmosphere, namely the unceasing arms race, would disappear for ever; and after disarmament was complete, any disputes arising between States would, by force of circumstances, be settled peacefully.

Hence the only possible point of departure is disarmament. It is there that we must begin. It is through the results of disarmament, and in association with it, that it will be possible to give the world an effective guarantee of lasting peaceful relations between States. That was, and is, our position.

The draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union confirms it once again; it recommends that States should enter into a series of obligations to this end. Article 3 of the Soviet draft provides in the first place for an obligation to respect the principle of peaceful co-existence. That principle has already been stated in various forms in many international agreements. The Treaty on disarmament should make it into a provision binding on all States. For it is difficult to imagine how relations in a disarmed world could be based on anything but peaceful co-existence and friendly co-operation. That last statement is worth emphasizing. In a disarmed world, when the threat of war and the use of force by any State have been removed, co-existence could be transformed, to a far greater extent than is possible today, into friendly co-operation between States with different social systems.

Article 3 also places all States under an obligation to strengthen the United Nations as the principle institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

Similar provisions are to be found in the United States proposals: in particular, in paragraph 4 of section B: "Principles". I must point out, however, that the Soviet draft clearly states that the United Nations is the principal institution for the maintenance of peace in the world. That difference is reflected in the individual provisions of the two documents. Whereas the Soviet draft relies strictly on the principles of the United Nations Charter and on the competence of the Security Council, the United States draft, as I have already said,



(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

in fact evades those principles. And yet the United Nations Charter originated in the progressive and peaceful efforts of the States that formed the coalition against Hitler, and was conceived as a basic document governing relations between States under peacetime conditions. Hence we should make use of every possibility offered us by the Charter to build an international co-existence based on its principles.

Lastly, the draft treaty under consideration includes a third category of obligations concerning the consolidation of international peace, including the establishment of a system to ensure international security during disarmament and in a disarmed world. In the past the Polish delegation and other delegations of socialist countries taking part in disarmament negotiations have several times expressed the belief that in a disarmed world military power will lose its present raison d'être. We still consider that the essential means of exerting pressure on violators of international law and order, so as to make them submit to the general rules of coexistence, are the measures provided for in Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. Can there be any doubt of the effectiveness of measures such as complete or partial interruption by all States of economic relations and communications of every kind, and the severance of diplomatic relations, with a particular State? In the modern world where there are close relations between States in every sphere, the complete isolation of a State which infringed the rules of international conduct would be a very effective sanction; it would work not only repressively but above all preventively.

Nevertheless, the Soviet draft provides for the operation of a system of essential military power within the framework of the Security Council's competence. This system could be used in case of need for action against breaches of the peace. At the same time, the Soviet draft treaty takes into account the proposals previously put forward by certain States, to the effect that the international security system should be instituted as soon as the disarmament process begins. It provides that, simultaneously with the signing of the Treaty on Disarmament, States shall conclude with the Security Council, in accordance with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, a suitable agreement under which they undertake to make available to the Council adequate armed forces and, during the last stage, contingents of police (or militia).

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

I do not wish to speak now on the organization of these forces in the different stages of disarmament, for that is dealt with in separate articles of the draft treaty and will be discussed later. I should like, however, to stress that the concept of the organization of these armed forces is in full conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. It will constitute the application of Article 43 of the Charter, which hitherto has not been applied. We consider that the adoption of the provisions of this article as a basis for organizing the security system and the maintenance of peace during disarmament and in a disarmed world constitutes a sensible solution that will guarantee peace and security to all peoples.

As is shown by the considerations I have just put forward, the provisions of article 3 are based on those of the United Nations Charter and on the principles agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States last September. To a large extent, they take account of the opinions expressed in our discussions up to the present on the problem of the measures for maintaining peace and security which should accompany disarmament. This justifies the belief that this article will be adopted by the Committee, bearing in mind the comments that have been made or will be made during our discussion.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): In view of the lateness of the hour, I will seek not to detain the Committee very long. I just want to refer to two matters which have arisen this morning. As I listened to the debate it seemed to me that I ought to state the United Kingdom viewpoint on those matters.

The representative of the United States -- and later other representatives, including the representative of the Soviet Union -- referred to the proposal which was raised yesterday in the Sub-Committee that there should be an addition to the membership of our Sub-Committee from the ranks of the unaligned nations here. This was the proposal made by the representative of the United States and I thought the representative of India showed some interest in this idea. Then it received a very rude reception from the representative of the Soviet Union.

The representative of the Soviet Union sought to build round this simple and straightforward proposal a picture of fantasy which had no relation whatever to fact. He sought to read into it the most sinister motives for which he had not one jot of justification. I find this quite incredible.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We urgently desire to make progress in our discussions in the Sub-Committee. I took this proposal as one which could facilitate our work if, and only if, the eight uncommitted countries expressed their desire to participate with us in the smaller group of the Sub-Committee.

It seemed to us that the most convenient way to arrange for such participation in the smaller group would be for the eight countries to choose one or two from among them. If that seems invidious to any of them, then possibly it could be done on a rotating basis, with two different delegations each day. But, when one is able effectively to negotiate, my experience is that it can be done better in a relatively small body. With respect to this subject, the proposal seemed to me to be a practical one.

But what did our Soviet colleague have to say about it? He sought to pretend that the proposal had behind it all sorts of sinister motives, that its aim was in some way to derogate from the position of the eight non-aligned nations, that it was seeking to cause dissension among them. I leave it to my colleagues in the Conference to judge for themselves what validity there is in this argumentation, which seemed to me to be so arid and so sterile as to be unworthy of serious thought.

Still, where does that leave us? It leaves us presumably, if that is the attitude of the Soviet Union, back where we were -- with the three nuclear Powers. If that is so, we shall continue and we shall do our best in the discussions among the three nuclear Powers in the Sub-Committee. I tried yesterday, as did my United States colleague, to get effective discussion started, and I hope very much that we can succeed in this. But if we are going to make progress, we must build on points of agreement and not seek points of disagreement. That is something of which I wish my Soviet colleague would take more note. It does seem to me essential, in the very atmosphere in which we meet, that we try to find where there is a point of agreement, and then build on it. It is essential, too, that we have a common understanding of what the document itself means. It is for that reason that I have repeatedly over the last few days put one specific question to our Soviet colleagues. I put this question on Thursday, many times on Friday and again yesterday at the meeting of the Sub-Committee. I shall not bore my colleagues here with it. It is set out fully in the verbatim records of our meetings. If members care to read what I said, they may turn to page 30 of the verbatim record of yesterday afternoon's meeting of the Sub-Committee (ENDC/SC.I/PV.10).

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I am only sorry that we have not obtained greater clarification of the Soviet point of view in this regard. However, I do not think it would be fitting this morning to pursue the argument at any length. I want merely to say that we still hope that we may get a common basis for our discussion so as to make further progress. I do deplore extravagances such as we heard this morning from our Soviet colleague in this regard.

With respect to the interesting suggestion put forward this morning by our Italian colleague to set up discussions between experts both of the nuclear Powers and of the uncommitted countries, I think this would be very helpful. If it meets with the approval of our other colleagues, I would welcome it. Possibly it is a question which could be discussed by the co-Chairmen. It is certainly a suggestion which is worthy of consideration.

I do not think it is necessary to develop further the point in relation to nuclear tests. I should like briefly to turn to the main topic of our discussion this morning, namely the question of the formulation of the next article of our draft treaty, which is where we all want to make progress.

In this connexion, I was interested in the various comments we heard this morning. My own feeling is that the United States document in paragraph 4 of "Objectives" and paragraph 4 of "Principles" (ENDC/30, pages 2 and 3) sums up the position with greater clarity and precision than does article 3 of the Soviet draft. However, it would seem to me that it certainly should be possible to get an agreed text between the two. I hope very much that this can be done at an early date.

It is quite clear that there are divergencies of opinion on the two sides, and indeed in the middle as well, if I may say so, on the exact interpretation of what we want to achieve. I have said earlier, on I think more than one occasion, that as we proceed with the disarmament process this part of our work becomes more important. If we are going to build real confidence, it must be solidly based on the knowledge and realization that the United Nations should be in a position effectively to maintain peace. This seems to me to be what is provided for in very general terms in these documents.

I listened with great interest to the remarks of the representative of India and the representative of Sweden with respect to the United Nations Charter, to its operation at the present time and to the appropriate Articles to which we should address ourselves. I think that at the appropriate moment we must have a very clear

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

discussion and decision with regard to what action we shall take. I do not think that we have reached that stage at the moment. In our desire to move forward, I think that we can find a form of words which will express our general desire with respect to this next article. But when we do reach the discussion at a later stage, after dealing with some of the substantive measures of disarmament, then we must think together very clearly about where we are going to place the authority and where we are going to have the forces maintained in this regard.

Again on this issue, our Soviet colleague -- if he will forgive me for saying so -- today seemed to be looking for difficulties rather than for points of agreement. He seemed to be casting doubts on the Western position as put forward by the United States. It seemed to me that at one stage he had almost forgotten the existence of the Agreed Principles, with their references to a United Nations peace force. I admit, as the astute representative of Sweden pointed out, the words "peace force" are in small letters and not in capitals, but they are nevertheless there. I think there is some importance in the fact that it is referred to, and is referred to twice, in the Agreed Principles. Therefore, if our Soviet colleagues agreed to a United Nations peace force -- without capitals -- last September, presumably they still agree to it -- without capitals -- today. I hope that in consequence they will find it reasonable and right that reference to it should be made in the article we are going to prepare.

As I have said, I think that the more concrete issues, as to where it is to be placed and how controlled, can properly be left until we have proceeded to those stages in the two draft treaties which make more positive provision for it. So I hope we can get a general form of words fairly soon now on this important provision -- and it is an important provision, but an important and a generalized provision.

I think we should all take careful note of the doubts and fears expressed in regard to the different Articles of the United Nations Charter. I myself shall certainly want to read carefully again what both the representatives of India and Sweden said in this regard, because I think it is very important. But I hope we can make progress in this way. I will not be drawn into polemics in reply to my colleague from the Soviet Union. There is much that one could say, but it does not really help us forward if one seeks to indulge in destructive criticism. As I have said before, that is not my intention and so on this occasion I will not allow myself

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

to be drawn into polemics; I will merely say that I hope that, as a result of the discussion we have now had, we can proceed to the drafting of the relevant article.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Today we have heard two kinds of statement made by the different delegations present. First, there were statements on nuclear tests of one kind and another, and then there were statements and speeches on the treaty on general and complete disarmament which it is our task to draw up. I wish to refer only to the statements concerning nuclear tests, which are occupying our thoughts because we know very well what the situation now is.

Last night the news was received that the United States and the United Kingdom were together preparing, and that the United States Atomic Energy Commission had been authorized, to carry out nuclear tests in the Pacific. That news has certainly aroused public opinion in all countries. In some countries appeals were already being made yesterday that the Powers preparing to carry out the nuclear tests should not do so. At our meeting this morning Mr. Lall, the representative of India, transmitted what I might call the appeal of his Prime Minister to the effect, if I understood it aright, that nuclear tests should not be carried out, at least while the eight-nation memorandum is being considered by the nuclear Powers - this in order to create a more favourable atmosphere for the deliberations on the memorandum and on the possibility of reaching an agreement on nuclear tests. I think that all, or most of us, endorse the appeal made by the Prime Minister of India, which will certainly find strong support all over the world.

Nevertheless, we have heard this morning another series of statements by certain Powers, first of all the United States, apparently intended mainly to camouflage the nuclear tests. This morning the United States representative repeated the proposal made by his delegation at yesterday's meeting of the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests, in particular that two or three of the non-aligned nations should be invited to participate in one way or another, so that they can give advice or work in other ways with a view, it appears, to reaching an agreement in the Sub-Committee. As the Soviet Union representative said today, that proposal was certainly made with the current preparations in mind; it was certainly a manoeuvre to persuade public opinion that the United States is perfectly willing to go on making tremendous efforts to stop nuclear tests, it appears, and to reach an agreement on the subject

(Mr. Tarabancov, Bulgaria)

at the very moment when it is preparing to carry out nuclear tests in the Pacific. That is why it made the proposal. But, made just at that moment, the proposal was intended and calculated to distract world opinion and opinion in our Committee. It might be described as an attempt to make the best of a bad situation -- the situation which the United States had got into by its decision to resume nuclear tests.

On the same lines, in the same context of ideas and, I would say, of actions, are the proposals and declarations we have heard about this morning in the statements by two representatives of the Western Powers: Mr. Cavalletti, the representative of Italy, and Mr. Godber, the representative of the United Kingdom. What is the Italian Delegation now proposing to us? The appointment of a committee of experts with, if I understood correctly, the participation of scientists of the non-aligned countries who could examine the technical possibilities of arms control and reach a conclusion on the subject.

This proposal, made now, on the eve of the tests being prepared for in the Pacific, is also designed to distract the attention of our Committee, of world opinion and of all those who are opposed to the tests, in order to lead it in a different direction and give the impression that the Western Powers are willing to negotiate, that they wish to do everything possible, but that they are not in a position to stop the tests. That is the situation. That is the meaning of the statements made here. I quite understand that as a good ally, the representative of a western country which is a member of NATO should try to help the United States in the diversion manoeuvre it is now attempting. But in any case this diversion should not be attempted just when urgent appeals to stop nuclear tests are being made.

The intention becomes even clearer if we consider the statements made a little earlier and the proposals submitted during the meetings immediately preceding this one. If you remember -- the Soviet Union representative reminded us of it -- the eight nations spoke as follows, in the statement delivered on their behalf the other day by Mr. Sahlou:

"No delegation of the eight, I feel, can really give elaborate explanations which would be a substitute for the work that we believe can be undertaken only by the parties concerned. We are not in a position to offer a synopsis that will spare you the effort of new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments and new compromises." (ENDC/PV.24, page 5)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The statement continued later:

"At this juncture, before we have any clear indication from the three countries concerned regarding their willingness to start anew on the basis of the joint memorandum, we believe that the memorandum has to be interpreted not by us "(the eight nations)" but by you, the three nuclear Powers. This, we feel, is the most useful approach for all parties concerned. I will go one step further and say that, even if we were in a position to answer all your questions, we think this would prejudice the eventual solutions to such an extent or in such a way that agreement on these very solutions would become more difficult to attain". (ibid., page )

That is the position of the eight non-aligned nations. But what happened the following day? Mr. Cavalletti, speaking as the representative of Italy, made a proposal which is diametrically opposed to this statement by the non-aligned nations. On 20 April, referring to the possibility that the eight non-aligned nations might facilitate the work, he said, quite contrary to what those nations had declared:

"Nevertheless, in the interpretation of a text" (he already wanted an interpretation) "the intention of the authors, the mens legis, is very important; and in this case I am sure that the authors sincerely wished to facilitate agreement.

"One question that arises is whether the text could not be amended or clarified by the authors themselves ..."

Why not? The text will certainly have to be amended to suit the Western Powers -- otherwise they will not accept it -- or clarified to make it acceptable to them. I continue the quotation:

"... now that they have seen the difficulties that have arisen and how favourably their attempt at conciliation has been received by all delegations." (ENDC/PV.25, p.25 et Corr.1)

What does that mean? It means forestalling the appeal to the authors of the memorandum, and saying: do you not consider it necessary to change your memorandum to bring it into conformity with the wishes of the Western Powers? Or at least, if you cannot amend it, could you not, for instance, clarify it so that it would have a different meaning? Thus a memorandum which is sufficiently clear and which itself says quite enough on this question was not wanted.



(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The efforts now being made by the Italian representative by submitting a new, so-called technical proposal have only one purpose: to distract attention from this grave issue which is hanging over the Conference and over the whole world, namely the nuclear tests being prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Pacific.

But the question whether we should have more or fewer technical discussions does not now arise. It is plain that the political decision of the United States has been taken. It is now a question of taking a fresh political decision so that we can create a better atmosphere in our Committee, so that we can continue to enjoy a good atmosphere of collaboration, as the representatives of the Western Powers like to say -- and I am very glad they say it. There is no need for little talks to clarify or amend documents already submitted, which speak for themselves. The question is whether we are going to create that atmosphere by a really political decision.

It now rests with the Western Powers. Are they or are they not going to take the necessary steps to clear the air and to preserve the working spirit of this Conference? Are they going to carry out nuclear tests against public opinion all over the world and against the wishes of the great majority of the delegations here, or are they going to give up these tests? This is not the time for petty manoeuvres to divert public opinion; the question is whether the Western Powers are going to take the necessary political decision. It is for them, the United States and the United Kingdom, to speak now. This is the question which must certainly be elucidated and to which an answer must now be given. It is the great question now before our Committee and before world opinion. The Western Powers owe this Committee an answer, and should refrain from petty manoeuvres to distract attention from this great question of their preparations for further nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): In view of the lateness of the hour I shall defer most of the remarks which I had intended to devote to general and complete disarmament until tomorrow. I shall be very brief.

At the end of his statement at our plenary meeting last Thursday the representative of India said:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"Please negotiate on the basis of our memorandum. You have your interpretations. Go together to a negotiating table. . If you wish, ask any or all of us to join you if you think we could help." (ENDC/PV.24, page 26)

On the basis of that statement by the representative of India I said this at the meeting of the Sub-Committee yesterday afternoon:

"It seems clear to me that the participation in our Sub-Committee on nuclear testing of the eight nations would be very helpful. At our plenary meeting last Friday it was suggested, and I believe each of our delegations agreed" --

by that I meant the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States --

"that it would be helpful to add some of the sponsors of the eight-Power joint memorandum to the membership of this Sub-Committee on nuclear testing.

"Therefore, I would suggest that the Sub-Committee request the sponsors of the joint memorandum to select two or three, or such number as they choose, of these delegations to join us in our work in the Sub-Committee." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.10, page.22) .

I did not say "two or three", I said "two or three, or such number as they" -- the eight -- "choose". I did not differentiate among the eight nations. I left it up to them. My meaning was that if they wanted to designate all eight, that would be agreeable to us.

That offer was immediately rejected by the Soviet representative at the meeting of the Sub-Committee. So far as we are concerned, we have made the offer and it has been rejected.

I regret it if the representative of the Soviet Union felt that in my remarks on general and complete disarmament this morning I was attempting to engage in polemics or distortions. I was not. I was trying to be as objective and as factual as I could be. I should like to show him the precise language in his plan upon which I relied, but in view of the lateness of the hour I shall defer that for my more detailed statement tomorrow on general and complete disarmament.

In conclusion, on the question of nuclear testing let me say that we have tried to negotiate. We have taken the memorandum in good faith as one of the bases of negotiation. I thought we were trying, in good faith, to negotiate on it yesterday afternoon. I will not amplify that at this stage; I shall do so later if it becomes necessary.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Let me say that the United States delegation thoroughly appreciates the high motives of the Indian delegation -- and indeed of the Indian Government and its Prime Minister, for whom we have the greatest respect -- in making the proposal we heard this morning from the representative of India. As I understood it, the Indian representative said that he did not like to use the word "moratorium". But without characterizing it, his proposal, in substance -- at least so it seemed to me -- was for an unpoliced, uninspected moratorium on tests while the joint memorandum is being considered. We shall be most happy to continue to give the joint memorandum, and indeed any other proposal, the most careful consideration. With the greatest respect, but with the greatest regret, the United States delegation must make it clear that the United States cannot again undertake an unpoliced, uninspected moratorium, although we are quite willing to continue with the negotiations in good faith and with the aim of arriving at an adequate and effective nuclear test ban treaty which would stop all tests in all environments.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): The Italian Delegation has tabled a proposal concerning the establishment of a committee of scientists of the nuclear Powers and the eight non-aligned countries. I think it would be best to submit this proposal to the two co-Chairmen and to hear their opinion now.

Mr. CAVALIETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I do not think the procedure followed so far has been to put questions direct to the co-Chairmen here in the meetings. I suppose the co-Chairmen could meet later and discuss my proposal.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): Yes, but I think we must now ask the two co-Chairmen whether they are willing to meet or not.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I think that if the co-Chairmen are to be able to discuss this question, they must obviously know how it is viewed by the representatives of the eight States. As nothing has been said on the subject, I think the question does not arise at all -- it is still in the air. There is, in my opinion, no need to decide anything now. Each representative can, of course, express views or make suggestions. The

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

co-Chairmen will, as always, listen to any views and suggestions, but I see no reason for a specific discussion of this question. Therefore it seems to me that we could simply close our meeting with the usual communique.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I fully agree with Mr. Zorin.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I have been informed that the two co-Chairmen have agreed to propose that the Committee of the Whole should meet tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. If there are no objections, we will have a meeting tomorrow of the Committee of the Whole.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-seventh meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. G. Macovescu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Canada, India, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Committee of the Whole will be held on Thursday, 26 April 1962, at 10 a.m., and the next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 27 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.